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Rackspace Spot breach: leaked credentials let attackers read customer Kubernetes Secrets

Rackspace says an attacker used leaked credentials to access its Spot Kubernetes platform on November 17, creating pods and reading customer Kubernetes Secrets. Customers are told to rotate tokens and all stored secrets.

Rackspace Spot breach: leaked credentials let attackers read customer Kubernetes Secrets

Rackspace has warned customers that an unauthorized party used leaked credentials to break into its Rackspace Spot Kubernetes-based container platform, deploy unauthorized workloads and read Kubernetes Secrets in customer clusters. The intrusion took place on November 17, 2026, and Rackspace is instructing affected customers to rotate tokens and every credential stored in cluster Secrets.

The breach also triggered an extended outage of the Spot administration console after the company shut down access to sanitize the environment. Rackspace said service was fully restored on November 21. The company has not disclosed how many customers were affected or whether data was exfiltrated.

What happened

According to a customer notification reported by BleepingComputer, the attacker had access between roughly 00:20 and 22:00 UTC on November 17. Rackspace said it learned of the intrusion on November 18 after a report from a customer, and confirmed the same day that the notified organization was affected.

During that window, the attacker could act as a legitimate user within some customer organizations. Rackspace said that access allowed the attacker to create pods, read Kubernetes Secrets, and list nodes and volumes. Any Secret stored in an affected user’s clusters could have been read, as could Spot API tokens or refresh tokens held by that user. How the credentials were leaked has not been disclosed.

Rackspace said it revoked affected tokens and sessions, removed unauthorized pods, rotated keys and strengthened access controls and monitoring. Sirish Raghuram, co-founder of Platform9, which co-developed Rackspace Spot, wrote on Reddit that access was deliberately disabled while the infrastructure was secured, describing a decision to shut down all access and sanitize the entire environment.

Who is affected

The incident affects Rackspace Spot customers whose organizations were accessed with the leaked credentials. Rackspace has not said how many organizations were impacted, and BleepingComputer reported that Rackspace had not responded to its questions at the time of publication. All Spot customers were affected by the console outage, which prevented them from managing clusters and rotating credentials until service was restored. No CVE identifier is associated with the incident, which Rackspace attributes to credential misuse rather than a software vulnerability.

Severity and exploitation

The incident is confirmed and the attacker had hands-on access for most of a day. Kubernetes Secrets commonly hold database passwords, registry credentials, cloud provider keys, API tokens and Git deploy keys, so exposure of a cluster’s Secrets can extend well beyond the cluster itself. Rackspace’s own guidance, which asks customers to review logs for databases, container registries, Git repositories, cloud storage and third-party services, reflects that risk. Whether exposed secrets have since been used against downstream systems has not been disclosed.

Rackspace shared the following indicators with customers, according to BleepingComputer:

TypeIndicator
IP address23.224.79.106
IP range23.224.0.0/15
Kubernetes object name prefixesi1, glm-, probe

What defenders should do now

  1. Reissue all Rackspace Spot API tokens and replace refresh tokens used in automation and CI pipelines.
  2. Download fresh Kubernetes config files for Spot clusters and retire previously issued kubeconfigs.
  3. Rotate every credential stored in Kubernetes Secrets in Spot clusters, prioritizing cloud keys, database passwords, registry credentials and Git tokens.
  4. Review logs for databases, container registries, Git repositories, cloud storage and third-party services back to November 17, 2026, for use of exposed credentials.
  5. Search cluster audit logs and network telemetry for the indicators above, including pods or objects with the listed name prefixes and connections involving the listed IP range.
  6. Remove any workloads that cannot be attributed to your own deployments.

SCVM analysis

Managed Kubernetes platforms concentrate high-value secrets, and a single compromised credential at the provider layer can expose many tenants at once. The fact that detection came from a customer report a day after the intrusion, rather than from the provider’s own monitoring, is notable. Rotation is the decisive control here: secrets read during the November 17 window remain usable until they are changed, regardless of the provider’s cleanup. Teams should also treat this as a prompt to reduce standing secrets in clusters, for example by using short-lived workload identities and external secret managers where the platform allows, so that a future platform-level compromise yields less.

Sources

About this article: produced by the SCVM Newsroom with AI assistance from the public sources linked above, enriched with NVD, FIRST EPSS and CISA KEV data, and checked by automated quality controls under our editorial policy. Spotted an error? Request a correction.

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