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Ransomware Medium

RansomwareHelp co-founder indicted over alleged secret ransom payments and markups

A Rhode Island indictment accuses RansomwareHelp co-founder Juan Ricardo Palacio Escobar of secretly buying decryptors from ransomware gangs while telling victims his firm never paid ransoms.

RansomwareHelp co-founder indicted over alleged secret ransom payments and markups

The co-founder and chief technology officer of RansomwareHelp, a Florida company that marketed itself as able to recover ransomware-encrypted data without paying attackers, has been indicted on wire fraud charges in Rhode Island, according to KrebsOnSecurity. Prosecutors allege the company quietly bought decryption keys from ransomware operators and billed victims far more than it paid.

The indictment names Juan Ricardo Palacio Escobar, 52, of Miami and Medellin, Colombia, KrebsOnSecurity reported. The charges are allegations and have not been proven in court. The case is the latest in a run of U.S. prosecutions involving ransomware recovery and negotiation firms accused of deceiving their own clients.

What happened

According to KrebsOnSecurity, RansomwareHelp’s website told victims not to pay ransoms and claimed its proprietary cryptographic tools could fully restore encrypted systems. The site also stated that the firm never paid or intermediated ransoms on behalf of clients.

The indictment describes an FBI sting in which agents posed both as a victim company and as a fictitious ransomware group. After the supposed victim approached RansomwareHelp and said it did not want to pay, the company restated its no-payment policy. Prosecutors allege Palacio then contacted the FBI-run group seeking its lowest price for a decryptor and was quoted 0.2 bitcoin, about $13,000 at the time.

Within 48 hours, according to the indictment as described by KrebsOnSecurity, Palacio told the fake victim its diagnostic assessment had succeeded and that decryption would cost $13,260. He then allegedly negotiated the decryptor price down to roughly $6,000 in bitcoin, while billing the fake victim $16,010, made up of a $2,750 diagnostic fee and the $13,260 recovery fee.

KrebsOnSecurity also reported an account from Paul Ihme, co-founder of security firm Soteria, about a small accounting firm hit by LockBit ransomware in 2024. Ihme said RansomwareHelp proposed a recovery price of $438,880, describing extensive forensic and cryptographic work, and insisted on unrestricted remote access through AnyDesk. Ihme said a later review found only one copy of the ransom note, recovered from a backup, and that someone had already been negotiating with LockBit for days. Chat logs published by KrebsOnSecurity show RansomwareHelp asking LockBit not to reveal the negotiations to the victim. Ihme believes the remote access was used to remove ransom notes; that claim is his assessment and is not part of the indictment.

Who is affected

Ihme told KrebsOnSecurity that the firm mainly targeted small and medium-sized businesses with limited technical knowledge. The total number of victims and the total amount billed by RansomwareHelp have not been disclosed in the reporting reviewed. The company’s website is now defunct, according to KrebsOnSecurity.

The case adds to other recent actions cited by KrebsOnSecurity and Mallory: wire fraud and conspiracy charges against MonsterCloud CEO Zohar Pinhasi, whom prosecutors accuse of paying ransomware groups $8 million while charging customers $19 million; cyber extortion and conspiracy charges against Cybersteward executive Edward Dubrovsky in a sealed case; and a 70-month sentence for negotiator Angelo Martino for conspiring with the BlackCat/ALPHV group.

Severity and exploitation

This is a fraud case rather than a software vulnerability, but the risk to victim organizations is direct. A recovery provider that secretly pays attackers can expose clients to inflated costs, loss of control over negotiations, and potential legal and sanctions questions they did not knowingly accept. Removing or concealing ransom notes, if it occurred, also destroys evidence that incident responders and law enforcement rely on.

What defenders should do now

  1. Pre-select ransomware response, negotiation and recovery providers before an incident, through counsel and cyber insurers, rather than engaging an unknown firm under pressure.
  2. Treat claims of universal or proprietary decryption of modern ransomware with skepticism, and ask providers to explain technically how recovery will be achieved.
  3. Require written disclosure and explicit client authorization before any contact with, or payment to, a threat actor, and keep payment decisions under the organization’s own oversight.
  4. Preserve ransom notes, chat portal details and system images before granting any third party remote access, and log all third-party remote sessions.
  5. Avoid granting unrestricted remote access to unvetted vendors; scope access to specific systems and time windows.
  6. Report ransomware incidents to law enforcement and follow sanctions-screening guidance before any payment is considered.

SCVM analysis

The ransomware response market rests on trust, and these cases show how a provider can profit from the information gap between attackers and desperate victims. The alleged pattern, publicly refusing to pay while privately buying keys at a markup, mirrors the MonsterCloud allegations and suggests investigators are now actively testing recovery firms with undercover operations.

For defenders, the practical lesson is procedural rather than technical: retain evidence, control negotiations, and verify provider claims before an incident occurs. Organizations that already work with a recovery firm may want to review past engagements for undisclosed payments.

Sources

About this article: produced by the SCVM Newsroom with AI assistance from the public sources linked above, enriched with NVD, FIRST EPSS and CISA KEV data, and checked by automated quality controls under our editorial policy. Spotted an error? Request a correction.

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